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Abstract
Health care payers have an increasing interest in using financial incentives to change personal health
behaviors, with an estimated 82% of employers using financial incentives for healthy behavior in 2013.1
Several factors are fueling this increased interest: steadily increasing costs that have been resistant to
traditional forms of control, the realization that the majority of costs are driven by chronic conditions, which
are themselves in large part a result of lifestyle choices, and emerging reports that incentives have successfully
modified behaviors in a variety of contexts.2,3 In addition, the Affordable Care Act allows employers to use up
to 30% of total premiums (50% if programs include smoking) for outcomes-based rewards or penalties.4
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Reward-Based Incentives for Smoking Cessation
How a Carrot Became a Stick
Health care payers have an increasing interest in using
financial incentives to change personal health behaviors,
with an estimated 82% of employers using financial incen-
tives for healthy behavior in 2013.1 Several factors are fu-
eling this increased interest: steadily increasing costs that
have been resistant to traditional forms of control, the re-
alization that the majority of costs are driven by chronic
conditions, which are themselves in large part a result of
lifestylechoices,andemergingreportsthatincentiveshave
successfully modified behaviors in a variety of contexts.2,3
In addition, the Affordable Care Act allows employers to
useupto30%oftotalpremiums(50%ifprogramsinclude
smoking) for outcomes-based rewards or penalties.4
Cigarette smoking is a habit that remains one of the
leading causes of preventable mortality5 and thereby
also has a large influence on health care costs. In a ran-
domized controlled trial involving 878 employees, fi-
nancial incentives worth a total of $750 increased long-
term smoking cessation rates from 5.0% to 14.7% at the
end of 9 to 12 months.6 The ratio of successful long-
term cessation in this study was similar to that achieved
among smokers given nicotine patches, sprays, bupro-
pion, and varenicline. Six months after discontinuing the
incentives, the initial quit rate ratio of 2.9 (14.7% with in-
centives vs 5.0% without incentives) remained at 2.6,
providing reasonably good evidence of sustainability.
Examination of the financial returns from implement-
ing a similar program was done by the employer where this
trial was performed, using available literature and factor-
ing in employee turnover. The model was reviewed by out-
side actuarial experts. The company’s conclusion was that
there was a 5-year payback period, consistent with the
firm’s time frame for other investments.
However, simply applying the reward-based incen-
tive program as designed ran into a series of unantici-
pated road blocks. In this Viewpoint, we explain how the
$750 reward eventually became implemented as a $625
surcharge.
Carrots vs Sticks
There are age-old beliefs about the use of “carrots” (re-
wards) vs “sticks” (penalties). Although these ap-
proaches can be seen as economically equivalent (eg, the
difference in the cost of health benefits for smokers and
nonsmokers can be framed in terms of either rewards or
penalties), rewards are seen by some program designers
as more desirable because they are not perceived as being
punitive and can offset the nonmonetary costs (such as
discomfort) to smokers of quitting. Carrots may also be
more effective than sticks for an employer seeking to po-
sition itself as a desirable place to work.
Sticks, on the other hand, are being widely used be-
causeoftheperceptionthattheyareeffectiveandbecause
they do not require employers to pay anything extra for
desired behaviors. A stick-based approach penalizes indi-
viduals who do not modify their behavior and has the ad-
vantage of incentivizing those individuals even when not
actually applied, because most people want to avoid the
penalty. Sticks may be more efficient because carrots need
to be frequently paid whereas sticks, if properly designed,
are more rarely applied, lowering the costs of assessing
compliance with desired behaviors. This is why, for ex-
ample, theft is penalized rather than nonthefts awarded.
Although the work by Kahneman and Tversky7 demon-
strates that a dollar lost affects people more strongly than
a dollar gained (loss aversion), sticks can be problematic
if the costs of monitoring are high and if this leads to an en-
vironment in which employees feel like they are being con-
stantly penalized, suggesting that selective application of
a stick-based approach is likely to be necessary.
The firestorm of protest at Pennsylvania State Uni-
versity that followed the deployment of a program in the
fall of 2013 that penalized employees $100 a month if
they did not complete a health risk assessment led to the
program being abruptly canceled. Although there were
a number of communication issues—and the program
planned to collect sensitive information from employ-
ees, such as plans for pregnancy and testicular self-
examination—this example illustrated that penalty-
based programs are more likely to generate resistance
than programs that simply offer rewards.
Road to Implementation
The management of health care costs had long been a fo-
cus in the company where the original study was con-
ducted and there was growing interest in creating a “cul-
ture of health,” in which benefit design and worksite
programs would be used to decrease behaviors that led
to chronic disease. Several factors contributed to the
transformation from carrot to stick. The finance group was
very involved in overseeing health cost management and,
due to their general reluctance to add costs of any kind
to the company’s bottom line, they were opposed to ab-
sorbing a sizeable up-front cost increase in the form of a
reward (estimated at several million dollars) despite the
company’s own return on investment modeling.
Contributing to their opposition was the firm’s de-
cision, based on input from employee focus groups, not
to enforce objective blood or saliva testing for evi-
dence of smoking cessation, which increased the pos-
sibility that employees would game the system to earn
the reward. The focus groups also uncovered strongly
held views that employees who are smokers should not
be rewarded for doing something that many employ-
ees had already done on their own (not smoking) and
concerns about fairness (ie, nonsmokers felt that they
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had been subsidizing the health insurance premiums for smokers for
years and did not want to add to this by paying rewards). Although
the health care team made the argument that there was no guar-
antee that cessation rates would be similar when changing from a
reward to a surcharge and that employees could be informed that
rewards for smoking cessation would reduce the existing subsidy for
smokers' premiums in the future, both the finance and human re-
source groups thought it most prudent to follow the focus group
feedback, although the research evidence was based on the carrot
approach.
Once the decision was made to impose a surcharge for smok-
ers, the decision to tie this into health insurance premiums rather
than a separate penalty was made for practical reasons. Tying these
differential premiums to payroll deductions was far simpler admin-
istratively than setting up a separate system for financially penaliz-
ing smokers. From a mental accounting standpoint rewards or pen-
alties that are administered separately are far more effective— a $100
check handed to a person is much more visible than a $100 addi-
tion to that person’s paycheck automatically deposited into his or
her bank account—but premium adjustments are typically used by
employers both because of administrative simplicity and because
this preserves the tax-free nature of the premium adjustment. How-
ever, in this case it would have been difficult to separately collect
money from smokers who did not quit, highlighting that while re-
wards can be made more visible by providing them through chan-
nels other than the standard payroll system, collecting penalties likely
would have to be done using existing administrative mechanisms.
In 2010, the firm began charging current smokers a $625 an-
nual surcharge. Employees could have the surcharge waived for 1
year if they agreed to participate in a smoking cessation program that
the company offered at no cost. Smoking status was self-identified
at annual enrollment, as the company decided that saliva or urine
testing to verify smoking cessation was simply too intrusive and ad-
ministratively complex to go with at the outset. Employees were re-
minded that identification of their smoking status, consistent with
all the information they provided at annual enrollment, was sub-
ject to the firm’s integrity policy whereby employees can lose their
jobs for not being honest with the company.
Conclusions
The road to implementation of this initiative led to a surcharge-
based approach that could differ greatly in effectiveness from the
reward-based approach that was originally tested. There is a need
for systematic testing of the relative effectiveness of rewards and
penalties in the context of health behavior.
In the context of smoking, in which all smokers would be pe-
nalized for continuing to smoke, theoretical arguments in favor of
using stick-based approaches because of lower processing costs hold
true because there are fewer smokers than nonsmokers. Imple-
menting a surcharge program as part of premium adjustments is ad-
ministratively simpler than alternatives, but direct testing of the ef-
fect of bundling such rewards—or penalties—with larger sums of
money, such as premiums, should be tested vs approaches that keep
the rewards and penalties separate from paychecks and insurance
premiums. Alternative efforts to leverage loss aversion through vol-
untary participation in precommitment or deposit contracts, in which
participants forfeit money they contribute if they don’t succeed in
achieving their goals, have been limited by participation rates typi-
cally in the range of 10% to 25%, a limitation that needs to be solved
for these tools to have a significant widespread effect on improv-
ing health.
The Affordable Care Act provisions enabling larger employer-
based outcome incentives4 suggest that hundreds of billions of
dollars could flow through such incentive programs. How such
programs are implemented will likely vary significantly in different
employer contexts based on the underlying culture and philoso-
phy about rewards vs penalties, and such decisions will likely have
a large effect on program effectiveness. In addition, researchers
should be aware that administrative challenges in delivering
rewards will limit their usage and that integrating the real-world
limitations of payroll and human resource systems into research
designs could result in findings more helpful to payers and more
likely to be used. A robust series of studies that directly compare
the effectiveness of sticks vs carrots vs carrots and sticks
together would help build an evidence base that could make
these decisions data driven and less based solely on culture and
beliefs.
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